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Unified Science and Logical Empiricism at
the 1935 Paris Congress and Afterwards
Hans-Joachim Dahms
Institut Wiener Kreis, Universität Wien (Austria)
Résumé : Pour la plupart, les membres du cercle de Vienne se sentaient
investis d’une mission philosophique et aussi culturelle : poursuivre la tradition
française des Lumières et l’adapter aux exigences du temps. Si l’on se demande
dans quelle mesure l’objectif a été atteint, la réponse est double. Quand ils
ont cherché à élaborer une encyclopédie empiriste, à savoir l’Encyclopédie
internationale de la science unifiée, qui serait comme l’équivalent de la Grande
Encyclopédie de Diderot et d’Alembert, l’échec a été flagrant. À cela, il y a
des raisons externes, comme la seconde guerre mondiale, ou la mort d’Otto
Neurath, le principal éditeur et aussi le moteur de toute l’entreprise. Mais cela
tient aussi à des facteurs internes, comme l’insistance de Neurath sur un Index
verborum prohibitorum, qui a empêché certaines contributions importantes
d’aboutir. Si maintenant l’on élargit l’horizon pour considérer le mouvement
dans son ensemble, un bon point de départ se trouve dans la critique très
polémique formulée par Max Horkheimer en 1937. L’examen des arguments
avancés montre que les positions défendues par l’empirisme logique étaient
beaucoup plus solides que ne l’imaginaient Horkheimer et l’École de Francfort :
la prise en compte des faits et théories scientifiques est et reste un ingrédient
important de toute politique éclairée.
Abstract: Perhaps not all, but certainly many of the logical empiricists
of the Vienna Circle, felt that they were undertaking a philosophical and
cultural mission for their time, namely to follow in the tradition of the French
Enlightenment and to adapt it to the requirements of their own time. My
question here is whether they were able to fulfill this ambition, and if so, to
what extent. The answer is twofold: when they tried to construct an empiricist
encyclopedia, namely the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, as a
counterpart to Diderot and d’Alembert’s Grande Encyclopédie, the project was
a quite spectacular failure. There were a number of “external” reasons for this,
Philosophia Scientiæ, 22(3), 2018, 289–305.
290 Hans-Joachim Dahms
including the start of the Second World War and the death of Otto Neurath,
the chief editor and main driving force behind the whole thing, shortly after
the end of the war. But it also had to do with inbuilt “internal” factors, such as
Neurath’s insistence on his strange index verborum prohibitorum, which stood
in the way of some important contributions. I then widen the horizon and take
the whole movement of logical empiricism as the object to be evaluated. I take
as a suitable starting-point Max Horkheimer’s very polemical criticism of the
movement (published in 1937) and evaluate his critical arguments. The result
is that logical empiricism fares far better than Horkheimer and the Frankfurt
School imagined: the acknowledgement of empirical facts and scientific theory
was (and remains) an important ingredient of every enlightened politics.
1 Introduction1
Let me start this paper by explaining its title. Its presupposition is that unified
science and logical empiricism had a definite aim. But did unified science have
a mission at all? And if so, what was it? Was its aim something that was
actually possible to accomplish at a given time? Or was it something that is
a permanent task?
As a relatively easy basis upon which the first question can be answered,
I will focus on the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science (IEUS), a
project that was initiated at the 1935 Paris Congress for Unified Science. From
this point of view, the answer to the first question is yes—at least in the sense
that its most important promoter and later on chief editor, Otto Neurath, had
a sense of such a mission, namely to achieve in his own time what the promoters
of the Grande Encyclopédie of the Enlightenment, Diderot and d’Alembert,
had achieved in theirs. It would be interesting to know when and how Neurath
conceived the idea of such an ambitious task, and what the other editors and
contributors of the IEUS thought of it.
And then of course we have to look at what became of the project: what
was the original scope of its ambition, and how much of it was achieved over
the following decades? From this point of view, my answer to the question
“Mission accomplished?” will be a largely negative one: very little of the
original plan was carried out. Of course, shortly after the publication began,
the war started, and some envisaged contributors found themselves with other
duties and/or priorities. But perhaps there were some intrinsic impediments
to the success of the project as well.
1. I have tried to preserve the lively style of the oral presentation delivered in
Cerisy, and have added toward the end some short remarks on the current political
developments (such as Brexit in the UK, and the election of Trump) of 2016, when
the article was submitted for publication. I thank the English translator for the very
valuable help in transforming my text into readable English
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So, if the mission was not accomplished, then perhaps the movement of
unified science and its logical empiricism—taken as a whole—succeeded in
achieving what the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science did not.
It is of course difficult to answer this rather global question, and one has
to look for a suitable starting point from which to tackle it. I will take
as my starting point a definitively negative answer that was being given
already between the first and second Paris Congresses of 1935 and 1937
respectively—that of the exiled Frankfurt School (including thinkers such as
Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno), who, up until that point, had
been on surprisingly friendly terms with the logical empiricists [Dahms 1994a,
21–68]. I will list the most important points of criticism formulated at the
time2 and discuss some of them, paying special attention to the peculiar
methodological approach chosen by the critical theorists. My conclusion will
then be that their criticism was largely unjustified, and that logical empiricism
fared better as a force of progressive thinking than its most outspoken critics
thought it would. In other words, logical empiricism did indeed succeed in an
important part of its mission.
2 The history of the IEUS and its original
ambition
At the first International Congress for Unified Science in Paris in 1935, it
was Charles Morris who submitted to the audience the plan to start an
international encyclopedia of unified science. In the proceedings of the meeting
one finds only small traces of his proposed resolution and the ensuing decision
procedure among the audience, in remarks relegated to two footnotes. One
of them appears after Morris’s talk “Remarks on the proposed Encyclopedia”.
It reads:
Resolved: That this Congress express its approval of the
International Encyclopedia of the Unity of Science [...] and its
willingness to cooperate in the execution of this project.
[Morris 1936, 74, n. 1]
And in the first footnote of Neurath’s talk “Une Encyclopédie internationale
de la science unitaire”, we find:
Sur la proposition du professeur Charles W. Morris, de Chicago,
le Congrès a donné son approbation au projet d’Encyclopédie
internationale de la science unitaire. [Neurath 1936]
2. There was a kind of revival of some of the arguments in the so-called positivism
dispute of the 1960s in German sociology [see Dahms 1994a].
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So it seems that somehow, between both Morris’s and Neurath’s talks,
perhaps simply by a raising of hands, the plan was approved by the
philosophers gathered in Paris.
After the Congress, the organizers of this endeavor started to look for a
publisher, and also for contributors. Otto Neurath, who had given a sketch
of the envisaged encyclopedia in the subsection “Encyclopédie” of the main
section “Unité de la Science”, where he explained his ideas for the unity of
this encyclopedia, became its chief editor (the others being Charles Morris
and Rudolf Carnap). They both entertained quite different ideas of its unity,
one (Morris) putting the emphasis on semiotics, the other (Carnap) on the
idea of reduction of terms and scientific laws. These themes were pursued in
more detail in the first published pamphlet of the encyclopedia [Neurath, Bohr
et al. 1938], to which the “big names” (as Neurath called them) Niels Bohr
and John Dewey also contributed.
After two years of busy searching, the publisher chosen was University
of Chicago Press (UCP). The delay was in part caused by UCP’s demand
that at least 250 subscribers had to be in place for the first series of twenty
pamphlets. It would be interesting to compare the total of around 3000 people
and institutions that received the advertisement prospectus for the IEUS
with the list of actual subscribers, and to analyze in detail their national
and professional composition.3 After a provisional list of contributors to
the Encyclopedia had also been fixed, publishing of the the first pamphlets
commenced in 1938. As you know, the penultimate one was Thomas Kuhn’s
“The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, which appeared in 1962 [Kuhn 1962].
It was not until 1970 that publication of the first twenty pamphlets, under the
collective title “Foundations of the Unity of Science”, would be complete.
But now: what were Neurath’s original ambitions with the IEUS, and how
did he manage to persuade Morris to collaborate and to submit the above-cited
resolution of the whole project to the Paris Congress of 1935? Let me quote
from a long letter written in March 1935 in which Neurath tried to convince
Morris of the project:
I have been busy with the plan for an encyclopedia—which has
undergone many changes—for over fifteen years [that is, from the
beginning of the twenties—Dahms]. It is now a long time ago that
I, together with Einstein and Hahn, and other mathematicians
and physicists, high above Vienna on the Kahlenberg, sketched
out the plan for the first time. Those were different times. We
thought of it in terms of Enlightenment, like the old encyclope-
dists, and Einstein also thought of it in this way. Everything gets
its turn in the long run. [Dahms 2005, 105]; see also Bourdeau’s
article in this issue [p. 17–32]
3. Both lists are preserved among the inactive UCP records in the special
collections department of the Regenstein Library of the University of Chicago, but
up until this point, they have been ignored (at least in publications).
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What had Einstein said on the Kahlenberg?4 In his letter to Morris,
Neurath cited Einstein’s letter of recommendation for the envisaged project,
as follows:
You have convinced me that your plan to build a people’s library
[Volksbücherei] is apt to fulfill the deeply felt need of many
people for education and cultural development in a highly effective
way. Your project can achieve for the broad masses [of today—
Dahms] an importance similar to that of the Encyclopedia of
the eighteenth century for the educated France. I am prepared
to collaborate with, as well as I am able, and will also try to
find benevolent specialists for your plan [as contributors—Dahms].
[Dahms 2005, 105ff., my translation].
A copy of this letter is indeed preserved in the Einstein papers, and Neurath
used it more than once (not only in his correspondence with Morris, but also,
for instance, with UCP), and, I am sure, brought it out whenever he was trying
to convince people of the importance and usefulness of the project.
The plan for a people’s library need not detain us here—some ideas were
formulated, some possible contributors named, but nothing came of it, in part
as a consequence of the economic crisis of the early twenties in Central Europe;
but also because Einstein declined to become editor for the overall project.
Later on, in 1928 the plan was taken up again. And here it might be
useful to say a little about the aims and structure of that project, now called a
reading dictionary (Leselexikon [for details see Dahms 2005, 108])—that is, an
encyclopedia not ordered alphabetically (like the French Encyclopédie), but
designed as a series of short pamphlets on special subjects to be read from
beginning to end, but with a register of all of them so as to serve also as a
dictionary in the usual sense. The overall aim was to give a general overview
of the contemporary state of knowledge in all scientific disciplines. Again the
parallel to the Grande Encyclopédie is drawn, which means that Neurath had
absorbed the idea from Einstein’s letter of a link to that tradition, into his own
thinking. Although the Leselexikon should be “free from all politics” in the
narrower sense, it should be empiricist and anti-metaphysical, unlike some of
the leading dictionaries of this time such as, in Germany, the Catholic Herder’s
Lexikon, or “the Brockhaus and Meyers Lexikons, with their nationalist and
reactionary tendencies” [Dahms 2005, 110].
The contents list of the Leselexikon was as follows:
1. Stars and stones (astronomy, geology, mineralogy, 5 pamphlets)
2. Plants (3)
3. Animals (not including man) (10)
4. It was from this hill that Prince Eugen of Savoy led his army to drive back the
Turks who had besieged Vienna.
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4. Man (including society and economy, technology, art, religion, science,
etc.) (60)
5. Logic and mathematics (2)
6. Geometry, physics, chemistry (10)
7. General biology and physiology (10).
Whereas the first project of the early twenties was to have been directed
mostly toward workers and employees as a reading public, now those “bour-
geois circles that are prepared to break with the past”, were also envisaged as
addressees. When one thinks, on the other hand, of the IEUS, the proportions
are completely reversed (think for example of the sixty pamphlets on man,
and only two on logic and mathematics, in the Leselexikon).
Before I proceed to discuss the IEUS project, it should be mentioned that
Neurath, in 1928, also thought about what he called renovation cycles—that
every couple of years a new edition should be published in order to bring the
pamphlets up to date with contemporary knowledge in their respective fields
(ranging from physics every six or seven years to society and economy every
one or two years). But then the development of the real economy (in this case
the global economic crisis of 1929 and after) brought that second project to
an end as well.
When the IEUS finally got underway, from 1935 onward, the boundary
conditions had changed dramatically. Now it was not the proletariat and
certain special progressive bourgeois people of Austria and other German-
speaking countries who were to be approached as a readership, but the
international community of scientists. Neurath nevertheless stuck to his
ambition and his aim to found something like the French Encyclopédie for
his times, and even spoke of the editors and authors of the IEUS as the “new
encyclopedists”. It is telling that Morris, who himself, at the beginning of the
thirties, had nurtured ideas of a big project for scientists,5 was from the start
skeptical even about the term “Neue Enzyklopädisten”. He wrote in July 1937
to Neurath:
It seems to me that the phrase “Neue Enzyklopädisten” should
be your own private one, rather than an official title, because
such a title has connotations which many persons otherwise
interested in the movement are not inclined to accept. The interest
of many people is going to be purely scientific. Furthermore
I think that, while there are some real relations to the French
encyclopedists, our movement is wider and with a somewhat
different orientation—at least for many members. Thus our Enc.
is really addressed to a different reading public than the French
5. This was perhaps also meant as a counter-project to his Chicago colleague
Mortimer Adler’s enormously successful project of a collection of philosophical
classics.
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Enc. was. [Morris to Neurath, June 13, 1937]; [Morris papers,
Regenstein Library, Chicago])
The remark about the different reading public is certainly true. But it seems
that Morris was in addition skeptical about the Enlightenment ambitions of the
project. So it seems that, from the start, there were some minor divergences
concerning the envisaged aims and functions of the IEUS, even among its
editors. Nevertheless one might ask whether what was achieved in the end
fulfilled Neurath’s grander (or Morris’s more modest) ambitions. This is the
question I will try to answer now.
I start with the overall plan with which the IEUS began. According to
Morris’s report [Morris 1969], four large sections were planned:
1. Foundations of the unity of science,
2. Methodological problems of the special sciences,
3. Systematization in the special sciences and the relations between them,
4. Methods and results of sections 1 through 3 for applied sciences or the
application of sciences (in education, engineering, law, and medicine).
The whole thing was to be accompanied by a visual thesaurus (as in the
French Encyclopédie), using visualizations produced with the Neurath/Arntz
ISOTYPE method of visual education [Neurath 1991], [Simoniello 2017].
Furthermore, a comprehensive index (as was already the case for the
Leselexikon), was to be added, but now in English of course. Ideally, the
IEUS was to run to twenty-six volumes (each of ten pamphlets), along with
ten volumes of the visual thesaurus.
So what became of the project? More than twenty years after the
project began, only the first two volumes of “Foundations of the Unity
of Science” (the thirteenth part) had been completed. This is important,
because the methodology of the special sciences (section 2) as distinct from
the “Foundations”, was largely left out, not to mention applied sciences,
technology, and so on. I also really wonder what the visual thesaurus would
have looked like, when it was meant to represent visually—at least in part—
such extremely abstract subjects.
So, all in all, the IEUS project remained but a “torso” [for details, see
Dahms 1999] and thus failed spectacularly to fulfill its ambition to become
a contemporary counterpart of the French Encyclopédie for the twentieth
century.
The reasons were manifold: the war, the reluctance of UCP to continue
publication during the war, only very narrowly overcome by the combined
effort of Morris and Neurath; and then Neurath’s sudden death shortly
after the end of the war, in December 1945. It seems as if the remaining
editors Morris and Carnap increasingly lost interest in the whole project.
But it should also not be forgotten that some authors failed to deliver their
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promised contributions. While it is easy to trace the published volumes, I will
concentrate here on the perhaps more interesting question of what was not
published.
Three cases stand out in particular. One was about the history of logic: the
Polish logician Jan Łukasiewicz was to write it, but did not deliver. Perhaps
his Aristotelian Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic can
be seen as a more fully-fledged version of the first chapter of it [Łukasiewicz
1951].
I will expand a little more on the other two cases. The second in this
series of no-shows is “Interpretation and Judgment of Art”, as the envisaged
author phrased its title. It was to have been written by Meyer Schapiro,
professor of art history at Columbia University, who had been introduced to
Neurath by Ernest Nagel. The correspondence between Schapiro and Neurath
is revealing.6 As in so many other instances, Neurath insisted from the outset
that the title proposed by Schapiro should be changed, because, as Neurath
informed Morris, both terms (“interpretation” as well as “judgment”) were
dangerous ones.7 In some cases, then, the obstacles to the Encyclopedia’s
progress came from within the group of editors themselves.
The longer the correspondence between Neurath and Schapiro went on,
the more the discussion entered into wider and wider fields: international
politics and the war of course, but also the situation of the intelligentsia and
the universities in Germany. Here Neurath singles out Heidegger as his main
enemy, telling Schapiro that he would like to teach this “little fascist boy” some
manners. Now, Schapiro did not deliver his contribution, as promised many
times throughout the fifties. When he missed another deadline, the already
notorious “Meyer Schapiro problem” was solved by Carnap, who in the sixties
served as the only remaining editor, by giving up the idea of a pamphlet about
art altogether and instead handing it to his former Prague colleague Gerhard
Tintner, who instead wrote something about economics.
One interesting thing perhaps came out of Schapiro’s discussions with
Neurath: when Heidegger later published his article “Das Kunstwerk”, in
which he gave a sort of Blut-und-Boden interpretation of one of van Gogh’s
shoe paintings, Schapiro would react with sharp criticism, perhaps somehow
trying to teach Heidegger scientific manners. He pointed out that what was
depicted in the painting was not the shoes of an old farmer woman coming
in from the fields after a long day of hard toil, as Heidegger maintained, but
van Gogh’s own shoes. Of course, the episode delivered a blow to Heidegger’s
6. It is now available in the special collections department of Columbia University.
7. Here Neurath’s habit of pestering everyone with his index verborum prohibito-
rum surfaces again, after his effort to convince John Dewey not to use “value” in
his contribution to the Encyclopedia, and later on his refusal to let Herbert Feigl
write something about scientific explanation for it, because the term “explanation”,
of course, is dangerous as well. According to Neurath, science does not explain, but
only aims to describe.
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philosophical approach since, in “Das Kunstwerk”, he had pointed out that,
in order to detect and describe the essence of something, we don’t need to
look at actual things in the outside world, we can just as well (and often even
better) depend on works of art depicting them.
As a last example of this number of unfinished contributions to the
Encyclopedia, I would like to mention a planned, but never executed contribu-
tion on the sociology of science. Louis Wirth (a sociology professor at Chicago)
was singled out as the one to write it. He had delivered his Dissertation in late
1928 on the ghetto (a phenomenon that can still be witnessed today in the area
around the university in South Chicago), but then turned for a while to the
sociology of knowledge and translated, among other things, Karl Mannheim’s
book Ideologie und Utopie [Mannheim 1929]. In Wirth’s long introduction
you will find the most concise early characterization of that new field of the
humanities (the sociology of knowledge and science) and a list of its tasks.
Wirth did at least contribute a paper on that topic to the 1939 Congress of
Unified Science at Harvard; but he too never delivered his promised pamphlet
before his premature death in May 1952, because he joined the war effort,
and afterwards took on organizational responsibilities within the International
Sociological Association, while also continuing to assemble material on a large
but ultimately never completed study on “The City”.
But why are these examples of Łukasiewicz, Schapiro, and Wirth of special
interest? They show that logical empiricism would have looked different—
more historical, more sociological, and also more culturally engaged—had the
original plan been executed. It seems to me that the IEUS operated a sort of
canonization of respectable fields of scientific investigation. Had it included
those other pamphlets, much delay and controversy about what could and
what could not be responsibly tackled, could have been avoided.
But, to sum up, the IEUS did not live up to the expectations of its
editors, especially those of Neurath and his ambition to form a group of “new
encyclopedists”, and perhaps to become, himself, the Diderot of his age.
In writing several articles on the empiricists’ Encyclopedia, I have asked
myself from time to time whether an empiricist encyclopedia could not also be
a desideratum for our time. But of course the specialization and branching out
of the sciences has reached such a level of intensity that it is virtually impossible
to get contributors for all the areas to be covered. It is also not easily
conceivable that, on the reception side, people of today are really interested
or sufficiently prepared to absorb everything that the different sciences have
to say.
There is also another problem: the innovation cycles Neurath already
thought about in connection with his Leselexikon in the late 1920s. The
sciences move forward at such speed that an encyclopedia must constantly
be rewritten. So it is no wonder that, in the end, all the great encyclopedias
such as the Brockhaus in Germany or the Encyclopedia Britannica in Great
Britain, have over recent years increasingly given way to Wikipedia. Of course,
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Wikipedia has more contributors than Neurath’s Encyclopedia, but it lacks
cohesion, since it is once again organized in the way of a Neurathian Leselexikon
(or the IEUS), and lacks much of its Enlightenment impetus.
3 Logical empiricism from the thirties to
the fifties
To come back to the historical description and evaluation of logical empiricism
in the thirties and forties of the last century: while the IEUS was not so much
of a success, could logical empiricism, taken as a whole, perhaps be regarded
as a force of Enlightenment in troubled times?
It is of course difficult to tackle such a complex phenomenon (the partly
overlapping fields of scientific philosophy, logical empiricism, and unified
science) as a whole and then to form a judgment on its performance on
the international scene vis-à-vis the tradition, ambition, and heritage of
Enlightenment and the application (so to speak) of the latter to the historical
moment and political situation of the mid-thirties and beyond.
My approach here is to start with a severe criticism leveled at the empiricist
movement, published by Max Horkheimer, head of the exiled Frankfurt
Institute for Social Research, and to ask whether this criticism is justified. It
was published in the spring 1937 edition of the Institute’s journal Zeitschrift
für Sozialforschung under the title “Der neueste Angriff auf die Metaphysik”
[The Latest Attack on Metaphysics] [Horkheimer 1937, 2002]— interestingly
enough, alongside an article by Neurath on the problem of the international
comparison of standards of living. The traditions of the Vienna Circle and of
the Frankfurt Institute were at that time not so diametrically opposed as they
may seem from today’s perspective. Horkheimer wrote his Dissertation and
Habilitation under the supervision of Hans Cornelius, a German adherent of
the neopositivist scientist-philosopher Ernst Mach; subsequently, as director of
the Institute for Social Research he succeeded Carl Grünberg, an empirically-
minded Austro-Marxist from Vienna. In the first half of the thirties the
Frankfurters enlisted the collaboration of Paul Lazarsfeld and Marie Jahoda,
both excellent young empirical social psychologists from Vienna (impregnated
with both psychoanalysis and logical empiricism), both of whom contributed
to the large 1935 volume Autorität und Familie [Horkheimer 1936].
During this time, Neurath discussed various themes such as the application
of logical empiricism and unified science to the social sciences in the exiled
institute in New York. He got a big surprise, indeed a shock, when he received
Horkheimer’s polemical article, the main idea of which is that the positivists’
concept of experience is doomed to remain ignorant of the evils of the present
time, and is therefore completely inapt to serve as a weapon against fascist
dictatorship.
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The main points of criticism are:
– a nihilistic attitude toward tradition and history,
– a lack of ethics and morals,
– the inadequacy of physicalism to describe social phenomena,
– a neglect of the distinction between the essence [Wesen] and appearance
[Erscheinung] of things and phenomena.
Quite a list! I will make only some brief remarks on the first two
items. Logical empiricism was indeed largely unhistorical, and sometimes anti-
historical. We need only think of the Programmschrift of the Vienna Circle,
Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis. There we read that the
members of the circle are glad to remove “the metaphysical and theological
debris of millennia” [Stadler & Uebel 2012, 89] and set out into a bright new
empiricist and anti-metaphysical future. As if the philosophical tradition was
comprised mostly of rubble! I doubt that any of them read a single page
of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (unlike the Polish logicians, of course). But this
Viennese anti-historical attitude is something that we find in contemporary
Middle-Europe in many progressive circles, both inside and outside philosophy.
I find especially telling the juxtapositions in the famous design journals Das
neue Frankfurt and Die Form, where photographs of good modern designs, say
of furniture and everyday utilities, are shown alongside counterparts loaded
with outdated superfluous and ugly ornaments. The latter are not criticized
or commented upon, they are simply crossed out with big red lines!
Likewise for the lack of ethics and morals! It has always been an
astonishing fact to me that philosophically brave empiricists and politically
brave socialists such as Carnap, Frank, Neurath, Zilsel, and others adhered
to a noncognitivist meta-ethics (whether in the Carnap-Ayer-Stevenson form
of emotivism or in the less well-known Dubislav-Reichenbach-fashion of
prescriptivism [Reichenbach 1951, 276ff.]) at a time when not only democracy,
but humankind as a whole was in danger [Dahms 1994b, 342–346]. It is
worrying in this respect that the logical empiricists were absent—almost
demonstratively so—in the numerous sections on the Crisis of Democracy at
the Eighth International Congress of Philosophy in Prague in 1934 [Dahms
2016, 150–151], one year after the Nazi “seizure of power”. It was probably
their non-cognitivism that hindered them from engagement in these themes.
But that can only serve as a factual explanation. In my opinion it is logically
at the same time a sort of reductio ad absurdum of their (noncognitivist) meta-
ethical standpoint.
This also, it must be added, goes back to a time when logical empiricism
as such did not exist at all. Reichenbach, who advocated it in The Rise of
Scientific Philosophy [Reichenbach 1951], had already, at the beginning of the
First WorldWar, written an angry open letter (together withWalter Benjamin,
incidentally) to a leader of the German youth movement, Gustav Wyneken:
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You old people who inflicted upon us this terrible catastrophe,
you really dare to talk to us about ethics and to try to give aims
to our lives? [Dahms 1994b, 335]
But whatever the roots of the anti-historical and noncognitivist attitude of the
logical empiricists may be, their standpoint was and is wrong in these respects.
But what about the distinction between essence and appearance, which
marked the difference between the logical empiricists’ and the critical theorists’
conceptions of experience? I concentrate on these aspects because the way in
which Horkheimer and his school discuss these problems is very interesting;
but they completely fail in their attempt to show that a logical empiricist
attitude is unable to tackle the pressing problems of their time.
Horkheimer singles out three historical examples for the test of logical
empiricism:
– the case of a group of anti-vivisectionists visiting an establishment that
conducts cruel experiments on animals,
– witch-hunting, from the Middle Ages onwards,
– contemporary anti-Semitism (i.e., in the first half of the twentieth
century).
What these examples have in common is that they put logical empiricism
to the test in especially precarious, dangerous, and deadly circumstances. Otto
Neurath would have approved of such an approach, given his major unfinished
manuscript on “Prejudice and Prosecution”. Except that his evaluation of the
test was (in one case) and would have been (in the other cases, I am sure) very
different.
Take the first example, vivisection: here Horkheimer describes a histori-
cally testified visit of an organized group of people against the vivisection of
animals to a biological institute. The group was deceived by the director of
the institute about the pain the animals had to bear because, as Horkheimer
cites from the report of that visit, “a simple transection of their vocal cords
had deprived the animals of the ability to give voice to their suffering”. He
continues with the following commentary:
The pleasure which the younger Vogt [the experimenter—Dahms]
derived from the gullibility of those good people is a perfect
example of the pleasure to be derived from naïve empiricism in a
world in which everything is attuned to deception. [Horkheimer
1937, 293], [Horkheimer 2002, 151]
But this example tells us nothing about the value or non-value of empiricism.
Both the voices of the animals and the removal of their means of expressing
their pain are empirical occurrences. As Neurath remarked in his long and
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only recently published answer to Horkheimer’s article,8 he wondered why the
group was not suspicious enough to look closer into the setup of that particular
vivisection experiment. No differentiation between mere empirical appearance
and a non-empirical essence of things needed to be invoked in order to solve
this case.
The second case concerns witchcraft and witch-hunts, also a historical
example, but this time about humans rather than animals. Horkheimer writes:
In the presence of a large number of protocol sentences bearing
on the existence of witches, the empiricists would not even have
been able to fall back on improbability. [Horkheimer 1937, 293],
[Horkheimer 2002, 174]
Neurath did not care to comment on that example. To me it seems totally
misleading. One has to distinguish here between the general belief in the
alleged attributes and powers of witches, and the different tests for answering
the question whether a given individual is a witch or not. Whereas the first
(the “theory”) can in principle be falsified by experience (and was indeed
falsified many times), the second group (the tests) already does not pass even
a purely logical critique. Witches were depicted as causing every conceivable
damage: causing diseases and mass epidemics (including the plague), causing
impotence in men, stealing the harvest from one farmer’s land and bringing
it through the air to that of another, and so on. All of this can be put to the
test of empirical observation and, of course, does not pass it. With the tests
for being a witch it is even worse. Take the case of the needle test. Here,
the prosecutors looked for a mark of contact between the devil and the female
body. That mark was thought to be insensitive to needles. If they found such
a mark, they knew that the woman was a witch. If they didn’t find such a
mark, all the worse for the woman, because the devil is known for his habit of
not marking his truest followers. So whatever the outcome, the test delivered
negative results for the victim. In fact it was only a pretext for the sadistic
judges’ torture of “witches”.
The third case concerns anti-Semitism and possibly other endangered
minorities:
While nine-tenths of the people agree that they see spectres in
broad daylight, and brand innocent social groups as devils and
demons, when they exalt desperados to the office of gods, in
other words, when a hopeless state of confusion prevails, a state
which usually precedes the disintegration of a society, it becomes
clear that the empiricist conception of knowledge is fundamentally
incapable of checking the spread of such “experiences” and
8. Pombo [Pombo 2011] and especially Barck [Barck 2011]; the authors and editors
of that volume suggest that they made this “trouvaille” recently, although it was
already described and discussed at some length in [Dahms 1994a, 166—173].
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of criticizing “common knowledge”. [Horkheimer 1937, 142],
[Horkheimer 2002, 166–167]
Now, neither racism (and more concretely, anti-Semitism) nor Hitler are named
here, but it seems clear that Horkheimer has them in mind when he speaks
on the one hand of the people singling out minorities as devils and demons,
and on the other of the elevation of gang chiefs to gods. So what about
this example? Jews were accused in Germany in and after the First World
War of being “Drückeberger” (people who avoided going to the fight, in
any way possible), as enriching themselves during the war effort behind the
front, as the ones who stabbed the glorious German army in the back and so
caused their defeat, only to once again enrich their international ilk by letting
the Germans pay the severe reparations imposed on them in the Treaty of
Versailles. All of these alleged “facts” can be put to the test of experience—
and that is what the Jewish Defense League had already done extensively in
their research and publications.
So this case does not prove Horkheimer’s criticism of logical empiricism
either. I am sure that the same outcome would be reached if, nowadays, one
took the problem of refugees, and especially asylum seekers as the example
of a persecuted minority: you only need to read what people like Trump in
the United States, Farage in England, or the adherents of the AfD party in
Germany say about them in order to see the great potential for empirical
refutations of their prejudices and lies.
The question is of course whether the analytical tools and potentials of logi-
cal empiricism were employed in sufficient measure by the logical empiricists in
the thirties and after in order to fight the forces of antirationalism, imperialism,
and racism. Edgar Zilsel certainly tried to do this in articles such as “SA
philosophiert” [Zilsel 1933a] and “Das Dritte Reich und die Wissenschaft”
[Zilsel 1933b], which combine rich material with incisive critical analysis.
I would also mention Moritz Schlick’s paper, presented to the 1934 Prague
International Congress of Philosophy, on “Der Begriff der Ganzheit” [Schlick
1936], [see Dahms 2016, 160–161 for comments]. Here he attacked holistic
conceptions in biology and social philosophy, in this critical category. This
paper was of course directed to an international academic public and so
contained hardly any direct political polemic, as was the case with Zilsel’s
work. Neurath, in exile in England, found time to write critical articles about
Plato as an (alleged) forerunner of fascism and national socialism [Sandner
2014, 284].
So perhaps logical empiricists, busy philosophizing and preparing their
Encyclopedia, did not care enough about the pressing issues of their time.
Therefore, their Enlightenment mission was accomplished, I would say,
only in part during the thirties and forties (see [Reisch 2005], let alone
afterwards). But it would be vastly misleading to underrate the potential
of the empirical assessment of alleged facts in politics. Particularly nowa-
days, when right-wing populists in Europe and the USA say and publish
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whatever they like—regardless of any factual truth in the content—and
most of their followers believe it without any attempt to put it to the test
of experience, the need for an empiricist philosophy remains as pressing as
ever, and perhaps even more so.
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